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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

I

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

v.

s

SALVADOR AYALA,

I

Defendant-Appellant.

Case i&o. 870533-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of Unlawful
Possession of a Controlled Substance With Intent to Distribute
For Value, a second degree felony pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1953 as amended).

The conviction occurred

after a jury trial in the Third District Court, the Honorable
Homer F. Wilkinson, presiding.

This Courtl nas jurisdiction to

hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-|2a-3(2) (e) (1987).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED) ON APPEAL
The following issues are presented for review in this
Appeal:
1.

Is the affidavit in support t>f the search warrant

sufficient to establish probable cause bas^d upon the totality of
the circumstances?
2.

Should the evidence seized ftom defendant be

admitted on the ground that the search, although presumably for
weapons, was expanded, based upon the fact that there was
sufficient probable cause to arrest?

3.

Did defendant have adequate command of the English

language to fully understand the nature of his Miranda rights and
to enter a valid waiver thereto?
4.

Were statements made to officer Labrum by

defendant, after he had invoked his fifth amendment right to
silence, properly admissible for impeachment purposes?
5.

Were defendant's statements either properly allowed

under his waiver of fifth amendment privileges, properly allowed
for use as impeachment, or properly suppressed?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. Const, amend. IV:
AMENDMENT IV
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. V:
AMENDMENT V
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.
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Utah Const, art. I, S 14:
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbiddenIssuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched, and th^ person or
thing to be seized.
Minn. Const, art. I, § 10:
Sec. 10. Unreasonable searches and
seizures prohibited. The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, h0uses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated;
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the plac^ to be
searched and the person or thing^ to be
seized.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iij) (1953, as
amended):
58-37-8.

Prohibited acts—Penalties.

(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter,
it is unlawful for any person knqwingly and
intentionally:
(ii) to distribute for value or
possess with intent to distribute for value a
controlled or counterfeit substance;
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-19(c) (1953, as
amended):
(c) No party may assign as epror any
portion of the charge or omission therefrom
unless he objects thereto before the jury is
instructed, stating distinctly thp matter to
which he objects and the ground of his
objection. Nothwithstanding a party's
failure to object, error may be assigned to
instructions in order to avoid a Manifest
injustice.
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51:
Rule 51.

Instructions to jury; objections.

At the close of the evidence or at such
earlier time as the court reasonably directs,
any party may file written requests that the
court instruct the jury on the law as set
forth in said requests. The court shall
inform counsel of its proposed action upon
the requests prior to instructing the jury;
and it shall furnish counsel with a copy of
its proposed instructions, unless the parties
stipulate that such instructions may be given
orally or otherwise waive this requirement.
If the instructions are to be given in
writing, all objections thereto must be made
before the instructions are given to the
jury; otherwise, objections may be made to
the instructions after they are given to the
jury, but before the jury retires to consider
its verdict. No party may assign as error
the giving or the failure to give an
instruction unless he objects thereto. In
objecting to the giving of an instruction, a
party must state distinctly the matter to
which he objects and the grounds for his
objection. Notwithstanding the foregoing
requirement, the appellate court, in its
discretion and in the interests of justice,
may review the giving of or failure to give
an instruction. Opportunity shall be given
to make objections, and they shall be made
out of the hearing of the jury.
Arguments for the respective parties shall
be made after the court has instructed the
jury. The court shall not comment on the
evidence in the case, and if the court states
any of the evidence, it must instruct the
jurors that they are the exclusive judges of
all questions of fact.
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Salvador Ayala, was charged with Unlawful
Possession of a Controlled Substance With Intent to Distribute
for Value, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
S 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1953, as amended) (R. 3). Prior to trial,
defendant filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence on April 14, 1986

which the Court granted in part and denied in part on July 22,
1986 (R. 35-36, 91-96).

Further, on August 19, 1987, defendant

filed a Motion to Clarify Court Ruling on Suppression of Evidence
which was denied in part and granted in part following a hearing
on September 15, 1987 (R. 128, 205-207).

[After a jury trial on

September 28-29, 1987, in the Third District Court, the Honorable
Homer F. Wilkinson, presiding, defendant was found guilty as
charged (R. 259-61).

A Notice of Appeal was filed in the Utah

Court of Appeals on December 1, 1987 (R. 270-73).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 14, 1986, Deputy John Conforti of the Salt
Lake County Sheriff's Office obtained a search warrant for the
premises of 8853 Julia Lane in the City of Salt Lake, County of
Salt Lake, State of Utah.

(Appendix B.)

Within seven days

previous to the issuance of this warrant, Deputy Conforti
arranged for a Confidential Informant (CI) to make a controlled
drug buy at the named premises.

(Appendix A.)

Prior to him

entering the premises, the CI was given a body search for
controlled substance and U.S. currency.

(Appendix A.)

He was

then given a predetermined amount of money, and subsequently
observed entering and exiting the house.

i/ippendix A.)

The CI

then turned over a quantity of heroin that he stated had been
purchased in the residence.

(Appendix A.) Another body search

was given, and, again, no controlled substances or U.S. currency
was found.

(Appendix A.)

The information obtained through this

controlled buy was supplemented by an express statement from a
second Confidential Informant that heroin had been sold out of
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that specific residence for some time.

(Appendix A.)

Based upon

this information, Judge Sheila K. McCleve found sufficient
probable cause for issuance of a search warrant for the premises.
(Appendix B.)
On January 15, 1986, pursuant to the search warrant,
deputies of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, assisted by
additional police officers, arrived at the residence shortly
after 9:00 p.m. (R. 285, p. 20). At the time the officers
arrived and began their search of the home, only a young female
and her baby were present (R. 285, p.5). During the search,
Deputy Upton found a .38 caliber pistol under a bed between the
box springs and the mattress in what has been identified as the
south bedroom (R. 285, p. 6). In addition, he found .357 caliber
ammunition in the closet in that same bedroom (R. 285, p«6). In
the north bedroom, Upton found what was described as two balloons
or one plastic-like baggie material containing a black tar
substance suspected to be heroin and a piece of cellophane which
also had the black tar substance on it (R. 285, p. 8). Also
found by Upton was a syringe and a silver-colored metal canister
commonly used to transport narcotics (R. 285, p. 8).
Approximately one hour after the search began, and
after Deputy Upton had turned his findings into the evidence
custodian and was checking the residence for what he though was
possible stolen stereo and computer equipment, defendant and two
others arrived (R. 285, p. 11). When defendant entered the
residence, he exclaimed, "I live here, what's going on?M (R. 285,
p. 25.)

Deputy Conforti initially conducted a search of

-*_

defendant for weapons, and subsequently recovered 96 balloons
believed to contain heroin and $1,320 in Currency from
defendant's pockets (R. 285, pp. 26-28)
Following this search, defendant was specifically asked
if he understood English, to which he responded affirmatively,
and Conforti then advised defendant of hi^ Miranda rights (R.
163).

After receiving the Miranda warnings, defendant declared

that he understood them and opted to remain silent (R. 163)
Deputy Conforti, as well as deputies Julian, Eyre,
Labrum, and Rigby, testified that defendant spoke understandable
English, albeit with an accent (R. 285, pp. 25, 41, 71, 73, 78;
R. 283, p. 89). Although defendant initially chose to remain
silent, he returned to Conforti about five minutes after
receiving the Miranda warnings and initiated further conversation
regarding the charges and criminal penalties facing him (R. 163).
In his Minute Entry dated September 23, 19187, Judge Homer F.
Wilkinson declared that the substance of this volunteered
conversation was admissible at trial (R. 2t)7).
Later that evening, Deputy Jay Lfeibrum initiated further
conversation with defendant (R. 283, pp. 9p-100).

The substance

of this conversation was ruled inadmissible by Judge Wilkinson
because it was an illegal violation of defendant's Miranda rights
(R. 207). However, at trial, following defendant's specific
denial of selling drugs and being the owner of the money found,
Labrum's testimony of the conversation that he initiated with
defendant was admitted for the limited purpose of impeachment (R.
283, pp. 72-83).
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In addition to the evidence found in the residence
before defendant's arrival, and the evidence found on defendant's
person during Deputy Conforti's search of him, $9,550 in currency
was found in the kitchen drawer and a small package of balloons
and a bottle of lactose, commonly used as a cutting agent, were
found in the attic (R. 285, pp. 26, 75). Items found on other
individuals who arrived at the house after the search began, but
before defendant arrived, included $7,242 in cash, a hype kit and
rolling papers, and 23 additional packets of heroin (R. 285, pp.
51, 62-63).
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of the
offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to
Distribute for Value and was sentenced by the Court to an
indeterminate term of not less than one (1) nor more than fifteen
(15) years in the Utah State Prison (R. 267).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The affidavit in support of the search warrant was
sufficient to establish probable cause for a search of the
residence based upon the totality of the circumstances test
advocated by federal cases and applied in similar factual
situations in other state courts. Although both informants were
confidential, the controlled buy was completely surveilled by the
police and the recovery of heroin was supported by a statement
that heroin was commonly sold at that residence.
The evidence seized from the defendant was properly
admissible because at the time of the search, officers had
already discovered in the residence a weapon, ammunition, two
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balloons suspected of containing heroin, a syringe, and a
canister commonly used to transport narcotics.

Thus, there was

probable cause to arrest defendant who had announced that he was
the resident when he arrived at the home.
Based on the testimony of several officers, and
defendant's own actions of never revealing any trouble in
understanding either the Miranda warnings <>r any other
conversation, the record shows that defendant had sufficient
command of the English language to enter a /alid waiver to his
fifth amendment right to silence.
Statements made after defendant had invoked his right
to silence were not admissible for the Stage's case in chief; but
were clearly admissible for the limited purDOse of impeachment.
Defendant's statements at trial were directly contradicted by
previous statements made to the police following an illegal postMiranda interrogation.
All of defendant's statements admitted at trial were
allowable either because they were made following a proper waiver
of his Miranda rights, or were used solely for impeachment
purposes.

Any other statements that defendant had previously

made were properly suppressed.

-9-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
BASED UPON THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES,
THE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE SEARCH
WARRANT WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE
CAUSE AND FULLY SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENTS OF
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
Under the federal interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, the test for
determining the sufficiency of an affidavit for search warrant
purposes arises from the decision of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213 (1983).

Prior to this decision, many states strictly adhered

to the rigid "two-pronged test" of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
(1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), which
provided that:
the Fourth Amendment requires that affidavits
based on informants' tips must set out
"underlying circumstances" sufficient (1) to
reveal the basis of informant's knowledge and
(2) to establish the veracity of the
informant or alternatively, the reliability
of his report in a particular case. . . .
State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984).
However, in 1983, with the decision of Illinois v.
Gates, the United States Supreme Court held that the AguilarSpinelli test was abandoned, and in its place, the "totality of
the circumstances" approach would be substituted.
Gates at 214.

Illinois v.

In this approach

The task of the issuing magistrate is simply
to make a practical, common-sense decision
whether, given all the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit before him, including
the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of
persons supplying hearsay information, there

is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be founp in a
particular place. . . •
Id. at 238.
That this new "totality of the circumstances" has
completely replaced the Aguilar-Spinelli analysis under the
federal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment was reiterated in
Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727 (1984).

In that case, the

United States Supreme Court stated, "[w]e did not merely refine
or qualify the 'two-pronged test.'

We rejected it as

hypertechnical and divorced from the 'factual and practical
consideration of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
men, not legal technicians, act.'"

Massachusetts v. Upton at

732, quoting Brinegar v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
However, even though it is clear that the "totality of
the circumstances" approach is controlling under a federal
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, Justice Stevens points
out in his concurring opinion in Massachusetts v. Upton, that it
may be a fundamental error for a state to base its decision
solely upon the federal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment
without any determination of the law based on its own state
constitution.

Jd. at 735. A similar warning was given by

Justice Durham of the Supreme Court of Uta^i in the case of State
v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986) when she stated "that despite
our willingness to independently interpret Utah's constitution in
other areas of the law, the analysis of st^te constitutional
issues in criminal appeals continues to be ignored. . . .

It is

imperative that Utah lawyers brief this Coiirt on relevant state
constitutional questions."

State v. Earl ^t 806.
-11-

There is some evidence that the State of Utah has
provided a stricter interpretation of Article I, Section 14 of
the Utah Constitution than the "totality of the circumstances"
approach rising from the federal interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment.

In State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1984) the

Supreme Court of Utah states that even in light of Illinois v.
Gates,
compliance with the Aguilar-Spinelli
guidelines may be necessary to make a
sufficient basis for probable cause.
Depending on the circumstances, a showing
of the basis of knowledge and veracity or
reliability of the person providing the
information for a warrant may well be
necessary to establish with a "fair
probability" that the evidence sought
actually exists and can be found where the
informant states.
State v. Bailey at 1205 (emphasis added).
Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985).

See also, State v.

However, other Utah Supreme

Court cases have entertained fourth amendment analysis solely
based on the Illinois v. Gates, "totality of the circumstances"
test.

See State v. Hansenf 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987); State v.

Espinoza# 723 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986).
In his brief, defendant uses the Bailey and Anderson
cases as the foundation for his argument that the affidavit in
support of the search warrant is insufficient because it fails to
comply with the Aguilar-Spinelli requirements.

The state submits

that the case at hand is easily distinguishable from Bailey and
Anderson and is the type of case described by the court in Bailey
when it stated:
In other cases# however, a less strong
showing of the basis of the affiant's
-10-

knowledge, veracity and reliability may be
required, if the circumstances as a whole
indicate that the informant's report is
truthful• . • .
State v. Bailey# at 1205-1206.
In

Bailey, the informant was a concerned citizen who

felt that he was doing his duty in reporting a burglary and
theft.

He asked that his identity remain confidential "[b]ecause

he feared retaliation and knew that the defendant and his friend
owned guns," State v. Bailey, at 1204.

lr} Anderson/ the

affidavit was based upon a sheriff's statement that "he had
received information from a previously reliable informant that a
wooden fence, . . . would be built on Anderson's property . . .
for the purpose of concealing marijuana plants being cultivated."
State v. Anderson/ at 1100.

In the case at hand, there is not

merely a statement from an informant upon which the affidavit is
based, but rather a controlled buyf supported by a general
statement of a second confidential informant.

(See Appendix A ) .

Bailey and Anderson/ while undoubtedly helpful in determining the
State's approach to the affidavit requirements in a situation
where there is a simple statement from an informant/ should not
be unquestionably generalized to include alsituation where there
has been a controlled buy in addition to an informant's
statement.
In arguing this point, the State will use the "sibling
state approach" outlined in State v. Jewetr, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt.
1985) and recommended by the Supreme Court of Utah in State v.
Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986)/ and will refer to the decisions
of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Coiirt of Minnesota in
several cases with fact situations parallel to the case at hand.
-13-

In the first of three important Minnesota cases, State
v, Hawkins, 278 N.W.2d 750 (Minn. 1979), the affidavit indicated
that there had been two controlled purchases, the latest
consisting of the police providing an informant with a sum of
money which was then passed on to an unwitting informant who made
the purchase of the controlled substance and then turned it over
to the original informant, who then gave it to the officers.
State v. Hawkins, 751.

In that case, the definition of a

controlled purchase is given that:
A "controlled purchase" involves providing
money to a buyer, who is searched before and
after making contact with the seller. It
also involves police surveillance of as much
of the transaction between the buyer and
seller as possible. . . .
Id.
In Hawkins, the court determined that it was no1
necessary to refer to the Aguilar test because of the direct
police observations of the controlled purchases.

Ld.

Further

reference was made to Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause, 25
Mercer L. Rev. 741, 778:
When [independent police] observations are
sufficient in themselves to demonstrate
probable cause, the final problem is thereby
solved and all information both from and
about the informant becomes a redundancy;
probable cause is established without
necessary resort to the hearsay." Accord,
LaFave, Probable Cause from Informants, 1977
U. 111. L.F. 1, 63.

Id.
The court in Hawkins further stated that because the
police were unable to search the unwitting informant before he
entered the residence in question, they could not establish
-14-

beyond a reasonable doubt that the heroin Retrieved came from
within the residence; but based on the police observations, the
conclusion that the heroin came from withi^i the residence was, at
least, probable, and the affidavit was deemed sufficient to
obtain the search warrant.

Id. at 751-52

In State v. Aguilar, 352 N.W.2d J395 (Minn. 1984) the
fact situation was much like that in State v. Hawkins.

The

confidential informant was given a sum of itnoney which was passed
on to an unwitting informant.

The unwitting informant entered

the residence, returned to the confidential, informant, and gave
that informant a substance found to be heroin following a field
test.

Based upon this controlled purchase, and information from

a DEA agent, the affidavit was submitted and a search warrant was
granted.

State v. Aguilar, at 396.

The Supreme Court of

Minnesota, referring to State v. Hawkins and the analysis of
independent police observation held that tl[ie affidavit in Aguilar
w

contained sufficient information to establish probable cause."

Id.
In the most recent of these thre^ Minnesota cases,
State v. Valento, 405 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. App. 1987), a
confidential informant (CI) stated that he ~juld purchase cocaine
from an unknown source through an unwitting informant (UI). The
police officer involved met with the confidential informant,
searched the informant for money and controlled substances, and
when none were found, he provided the confidential informant with
money for the purchase.

Surveillance was maintained as the CI

met with the UI, the UI travelled to a residence—unknown until
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this time—and then the UI returned to the CI.

The CI then met

with the police, gave them what he had received from the UI
(which was determined to be cocaine), and was again searched for
money and controlled substances.

State v. Valento, at 916.

In analyzing Valento, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota
referred to both Hawkins and Aguilar.

However, Valento is

distinguished from Hawkins because there was only one controlled
buy, and distinguished from both cases because prior to the
purchase, the police did not even suspect the residence that was
searched.

However, due to police observations and the efficiency

of the controlled purchase, it was determined that the reasonable
inference was that the cocaine had come from the residence in
question and there was probable cause for a search warrant.

Id.

at 918. Also in this case, the Court relies upon the "totality
of circumstances" approach as derived from Illinois v. Gates.
Although there is no discussion as to the reason for the use of
the federal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment rather than a
direct analysis of the search and seizure provision in the
Minnesota Constitution, Article I, Section 10, an argument may be
made that the Court's analysis of this particular issue remained
the same under Valento and the federal requirements of Illinois
v. Gates as it did in Hawkins under the Aguilar v. Texas
approach.

This suggests that the Courts of Minnesota did not

bend their analysis with changing federal interpretation, but
distinguished their analysis in Hawkins from the prongs of
Aguilar, and supported their analysis in Valento with the
applicable totality of circumstances approach of Illinois v._

Gates.

Thus/ Minnesota may serve as an ejxample of a state that

has developed its own laws—presumably under the Minnesota
Constitution—and has determined that in a case such as that at
hand which includes a confidential informant and a controlled
purchase, the proper analysis fits perfectly under the totality
of the circumstances approach and is most likely one of the
"other cases" spoken of by the Supreme Court of Utah in State v.
Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984).
In the instant case, a detective with the Salt Lake
County Sheriff's Narcotics Unit made arrangements with a
confidential informant to make a controlled drug purchase at the
residence in question.

(Appendix A.) A full body search for

controlled substances and currency was made on the confidential
informant and he was then given a specific sum of money with
which to make the purchase.

Jd.

The confidential informant was

under continual observation, except when he was inside the home.
Id.

After he exited the home, the confidential informant gave

the police what was later identified as heroin.

Jd.

He was

again searched for controlled substances and money, and again
nothing was found.

Ld.

This controlled purchase was

supplemented by a general statement from a second confidential
informant that heroin was sold from the residence in question.
Id.
Obviously, the facts in this case are even more
reliable than those found acceptable in State v. Valento.

Here,

there was no middleman; the confidential informant purchased the
drugs himself and was subject to a complete search before and
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after he was in the residence.

Also, in this case, the police

had a specific residence in suspicion before initiating the
controlled purchase.
The State submits that under the totality of the
circumstances approach of Illinois v. Gates, as relied upon in
State v. Valento, the affidavit contained sufficient information
to establish probable cause for the search warrant for the house.
The State further submits that even if the Court wishes to go
beyond the federal approach and offer a more stringent reading of
search and seizure requirements based upon the Utah Constitution,
Article I, Section 14, it should consider the analysis used in
Minnesota—under an almost identical constitutional section.
Certainly, direct police control and observation
inherent in a controlled buy investigation adds significantly to
the credibility and basis of knowledge prongs required under the
Aquilar-Spinelli test.

To require more than the care taken in

this prime example of a controlled purchase situation, may be to
move away from warrants based on probabilities toward warrants
requiring substantial proof.

An informant's tip or statement may

necesitate further substantiation to "secure the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures."

Utah Constitution,

Article I, Section 14. However, additional requirements than
those provided in the instant situation do nothing more in
protecting citizens' rights.

In fact, more requirements may

discourage the police from so carefully observing and controlling
a drug buy as they did here in order to satisfy the probable

cause standard.

Instead, the police may t|e encouraged to simply

use an affiant who can describe well, and who has worked for the
police an arbitrary number of time in order to establish
reliability, rather than stage an ideal controlled drug buy with
a confidential informant, as was done here|, simply so that the
necessary "prongs" are satisfied.

Such a sacrifice of precesion

police work for statistical achievement should not be
recommended.
Defendant further contends that ^he State's failure to
disclose the names of the confidential intormants relied upon for
a determination of probable cause also violates his
Constitutional rights.

The State refused to supply the identity

of the informants because, first, the informants were still being
used in undercover narcotics investigation^ and disclosure might
prejudice those investigations, and, seconp, the disclosure is
not essential to assure a fair determination of the issues. The
confidential informants were used only in Establishing probable
cause necessary for obtaining a search warrant.

In the case of

State v. Bankheadf 514 P.2d 800 (Utah 1973), the Supreme Court of
Utah specifically held that "the courts will not compel
disclosure of the identity of an informantf who has supplied
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant, where disclosure is
sought merely to aid in attacking probable cause.M
802.

Bankhead, at

See also State v. Sessions, 583 P.2d 44 (Utah 1978).

The

State avers that defendant has not carried his burden of showing
that the informant was a material witness and urges the Court to
find that the trial court properly denied defendant's disclosure
request.
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POINT II
THE EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT'S PERSON
SHOULD BE ADMITTED BECAUSE THE SEARCH OF
DEFENDANT OCCURRED AFTER THERE WAS PROBABLE
CAUSE TO ARREST DEFENDANT.
The State recognizes that defendant has divided his
argument concerning the search and seizure into two parts in
which he argues that 1) his constitutional rights were violated
because the search was unreasonable, and 2) the seizure was not
legitimate as part of a pat-down search.

The State addresses

both arguments in one point because if there was probable cause
to arrest defendant at the time of the search, both the search
and the subsequent seizure of the questioned items were proper.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provide
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Defendant

submits that this protection leads to "a well established rule
that a warrant authorizing the search of a premises does not
extend to authorize the search of a person found on the
premises."

Defendant's Brief at 15. However, in State v. Banks,

720 P.2d 1380, 1383 (Utah 1986) the Supreme Court of Utah noted
an important exception when they stated:
[A] person's mere presence in the company of
others whom the police have probable cause to
search does not provide probable cause to
search that person. United States v. Pi Re,
332 U.S. 581, 587, 68 S.Ct. 222, 225, 92
L.Ed. 210 (1948). Nor are police officers
authorized to search an individual merely
because that person is present on premises
for which a search has been authorized, id.,
unless there is some independent probable
cause to justify a search of the individual.
CJ.. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92-93
and n. 4, 100 S.Ct. 338, 342-43 and n. 4, 62
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L.Ed.2d 238 (1979); United States v. Peep,
490 F.2d 903, 905 (8th Cir. 1974).
In the case at hand, a no-knock Search warrant had been
issued for the residence at 8853 West Julia Lane (R. 285, p. 5).
Approximately fifty minutes following the beginning of the
search, defendant and two others arrived at the residence (R.
285, p. 24). Before the arrival of defendant, Deputy James Upton
had found a .38 caliber pistol, some ammunition, two balloons
described as Mone plastic-like baggy material containing a black
tar substance, one piece of cellophane whicfh had a black tar
substance on it. . . a syringe and a silver colored metal
canister commonly used to transport narcotics in."

(R. 285, pp.

6, 8, 11.)
Upon specific questioning, Deputy) John Conforti, who
subsequently searched defendant, testified that he had been made
aware of the finding of the firearm before the arrival of
defendant (R. 285, pp. 23-24).

When asked ^hy defendant and his

two companions were searched upon entering the residence, Deputy
Conforti explained that "initially the search was conducted for
our own safety because we had information tjiat there were weapons
in the house and we'd already located one firearm in the house
prior to their arrival.-

(R. 285, pp. 25-26).

I
According to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), the
officers were justified in performing a pat^down search for
weapons in order to insure their safety.

See also Adams v.

Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380
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(Utah 1986).

Additionally, it has been written that:

the courts were willing to permit frisk of
persons found in or coming to places being
searched pursuant to warrant even in the
absence of evidence specifically tending to
connect those persons with the criminal
activity under investigation. Rather, it was
deemed sufficient that the criminal activity
to which the search warrant relates is fairly
serious and that the person frisked
reasonably appears to be an acquaintance of
the person in possession of the premises. As
stated by one court, because "it is generally
known by the police and others that those who
traffic in large quantities of narcotics are
often armed," the "mere presence of a person
or persons in such an environment, presents
that reasonable suspicion and belief, which
gives rise to sufficient and legal
justification to frisk all present for
weapons."
LaFave, Search and Seizure, Section 4.9(d) (1982).
However, defendant does not direct his argument at the
Terry weapons search; rather, he submits that the $1,320 in
currency and the 96 balloons of heroin found by the deputy during
the initial search should be suppressed because the "soft object"
(R. 285, p. 44) was obviously not a weapon, and any search beyond
the stop and frisk was beyond that specified in the warrant to
search the residence.

However, in this case, the facts were such

that probable cause to arrest the defendant had already arisen,
and the thorough search of the defendant was thereby justified as
a search incident to an arrest.
According to the issued search warrant, the purpose of
the no-knock search was to find "heroin, cutting agents, weighing
and packaging materials, transactions, ledgers and other related
controlled substances and/or devices."

(Appendix A ) . This

warrant was granted because a controlled purchase of heroin at
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that residence had established probable chuse that evidence of
the crime of Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to
Distribute for Value might be found at thte residence•
A).

(Appendix

Before defendant arrived, the police had discovered a

weapon, two balloons containing a black t^r substance suspected
to be heroin, and drug paraphernalia (R. 285, p. 6, 8, 11). Upon
arriving at the home, defendant stated, "J live here, what's
going on?"

(R. 285, p. 25).
In a similar case, Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692

(1981), the United States Supreme Court said the search warrant
of a residence implicitly carried with it[the limited authority
i

to detain the occupants of the premises iri which a search was
conducted.

Michigan v. Summers, at 701.

In that case, the

police had obtained a search warrant for the premises.

The

police detained the owner of the residence from leaving when they
began the search, and while he was still being properly detained,
narcotics were discovered in the home.

Id. at 693. The police

then arrested the owner and in a subsequent search found an
envelope of heroin on his person, ^d.

Justice Stevens said that

"because it was lawful to require respondeat to re-enter and to
remain in the house until evidence establishing probable cause to
arrest him was found, his arrest and the search incident thereto
were constitutionally permissible."

^d. a^ 692.
i

In this case, defendant was not Retained at the
premises before the search began.

However! by the time that he

arrived and identified himself as a resident of the home,
i

sufficient evidence to establish probable cfeause for an arrest had
been found, and defendant was properly searched.
-23-

Another inconsistency between the instant case and
Michigan v. Summers is that in Summers the resident was arrested
and then searched.

In this case, the formal arrest was not made

until after defendant had been searched and the currency and 96
balloons had also been found (T. 38). However, this concern was
specifically addressed in the case of State v. Banks, 720 P.2d
1380, 1383-84 (Utah 1986).

The Supreme Court of Utah stated:

A search is not invalid, despite the fact
that it precedes a formal arrest, so long as
the arrest and the search are substantially
contemporaneous and probable cause to effect
the arrest exists independent of the evidence
seized in the search. E.g., Buick v. United
States, 396 F.2d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1968),
cert, denied, 393 U.S. 1068, 89 S.Ct. 724, 21
L.Ed.2d 711 (1969); United States v. Thomas,
432 F.2d 120, 122 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1022, 91 S.Ct. 587, 27
L.Ed.2d 634 (1971). Prior to searching Banks
and discovering the drug vial in his pocket,
the officers had discovered other drugs and a
loaded firearm in the immediate vicinity.
Thus, the search revealing the drug vial was
preceeded by probable cause and was therefore
a valid search incident to arrest.
In the instant case, a controlled purchase which led to
the issuance of the search warrant suggested that a resident at
this home had been selling heroin.

When defendant arrived, he

stated that he lived in the residence and demanded to know what
was going on.

Prior to his arrival, the officers had discovered

the two balloons containing the black tar substance suspected to
be heroin, drug paraphernalia, and a weapon.

The combination of

these facts gave Deputy Conforti, who had prepared the affidavit
and led the subsequent search, reason not only to frisk defendant
for weapons, but to search defendant as an expansion of the
search of the residence to a search of the resident incident to
probable cause for his arrest.
-24-

In the case of Boyd v. State# 621 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Cr.
App. 1981), three police officers were infbrmed that narcotics
were being sold out of a cafe.

The office^ surveyed the premises

and observed an exchange of several small ^in foil bindles for
cash.

Following such an exchange, the officers observed

defendant in that case leave the establishment and return to his
car.

The defendant was stopped by the officers and two bindles

were removed from the defendant's pocket.

Defendant's contention

was that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him and
that the evidence found, two bindles containing heroin, should
have been suppressed.

At trial, the police officer testified

that he was familiar with the packaging of heroin and
specifically stated that he was aware that heroin was commonly
packaged in balloons or bindles.

The court found that "[t]he

observed exchanges of money for tinfoil bindles coupled with the
officer's knowledge that heroin is normallV packaged in tinfoil
bindles was sufficient to provide probable cause to believe that
an offense had been committed."

Boyd v. S^ate at 617.

Therefore, the warrantless arrest was determined to be proper and
defendant's motion to dismiss was denied.
In this case, Conforti's knowledge of the general
situation and his specific narcotics training also support a
finding of probable cause.

Conforti procured the search warrant

for the house and was involved in the controlled drug buy that
led to the warrant (R. 285, p. 20; Appendix A).

The officer had

also worked in the narcotics division for Seven months and during
the previous two and one-half years while he had been working
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vice, he was also involved in narcotics work and had participated
in several drug buys—four or five involving heroin (R. 285, pp.
29-30).

He further testified that the heroin had been packaged

in balloons on each of these occasions (R. 285, p. 31). This
knowledge is very important because it gave greater weight to the
evidence that had been found prior to defendant's arrival.
Conforti knew that there had been a controlled drug by at this
residence, and he knew the purpose of the search of the
residence—to find evidence of the possession and distribution of
narcotics.

Obviously, when Deputy Upton found the balloons

containing the black tar substance, he suspected it of being
narcotics.

Otherwise, he would have had no purpose in taking it

into evidentiary custody.

Conforti's additional knowledge of the

entire situation and his specific expertise in narcotics
trafficking offered further significance to the finding.

He had

seen similar packaging of heroin and he was aware that heroin had
been purchased from the house less than seven days earlier (R.
285, pp. 29-30; Appendix A).

Therefore, when defendant arrived

and announced his residence, according to the analysis of Boyd v.
State, the warrantless arrest and search of defendant was
appropriate based on Deputy Conforti's knowledge of the entire
situation, his previous narcotics experience, and the evidence
found in the residence prior to defendant's arrival.
In his Memorandum of Law in Support of defendant's
Petition for Certificate of Probable Cause, defendant contends
that the recent case of State v. Northrup, 83 Utah Adv. Rep. 28
(Ct. App. filed May 26, 1988) ''compels the conclusion that the
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the evidence seized from defendant's person was illegally seized
and should have been suppressed by the trial court as demanded."
(Memorandum at 2-3). In that case, following the arrest of an
unwitting narcotics informant/buyer, the pcblice received word
that someone was leaving the residence in question.

They quickly

stopped the vehicle, but found nothing in their search of the
driver.

The officer, believing that the evidence (marked bills)

might be destroyed, forcibly entered the residence, conducted a
protective sweep of the house, patted-down the occupants, and
found the money that they were looking for on one of the
residents—all before obtaining a search warrant.
The Court analyzed the issue of Whether or not the
evidence seized in the pat-down of Northrup was properly admitted
by use of the independent source analysis dnd the inevitable
discovery doctrine.

Under the independent source analysis, the

Court determined that the officers had no evidence independent of
their illegal entry which would have given them sufficient
probable cause to assist and search Northrub.

Northrup was

merely a person within the home that the police illegally
entered, and, without further ties, was not| sufficiently
connected to the evidence to establish causb for his arrest.
In the Northrup discussion of the inevitable discovery
doctrine, the Court determined that without the police error, the
evidence seized in the illegal pat-down search would not have
been discovered.

The police, in Northrup, |iad no specific

connection to the defendant, so the search warrant, had it been
obtained, would have been solely for the purpose of searching the
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residence for evidence relating to the sale of the controlled
substance retrieved form the unwitting buyer/informant, or,
specifically, the marked bills.

Since the money was on the

defendant, the officers would not have found it because the
search was limited to the house.

Also, since the defendant could

not have been specifically connected to the sale of narcotics, or
the residence in question, a search of his person would have been
improper.

Therefore, the money would not have been inevitably

discovered, and the pat-down search which followed an illegal
entry was clearly "fruit of the poisonous tree."
The State submits that the factual dissimilarities
between the two cases clearly distinguishes the applicability of
the Northrup analysis from the issues presented here.

In this

case, officers were legally in the home under a valid search
warrant before defendant arrived.

Also before he arrived, they

had found a weapon, ammunition, two balloons suspected of
containing heroin, a syringe, and a canister commonly used for
transporting narcotics (R. 285, p. 8). The State submits that
when defendant arrived and identified himself as the resident of
the house in which the evidence had been seized, the police had
probable cause based on the evidence already obtained to search
defendant incident to an arrest.

Thus, the search was properly

given, the evidence was properly obtained, and it should not now
be suppressed.

An analysis of the independent source theory and

the inevitable discovery doctrine is unnecessary here because the
entry was legal and defendant was sufficiently connected to the
residence to allow for his arrest.
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Admittedly, it would have

been more appropriate for the officers tp simply have arrested
defendant prior to the search, instead of} seemingly "expanding"
the weapons search based on his declaration of residency; but, in
the light of the presence of probable caiise for arrest, and based
upon the foregoing argument, this procedi^ral variance is, at
most, harmless error.
POINT III
DEFENDANT HAD ADEQUATE COMMAND OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE TO FULLY UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF
HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS AND TO ENTER! A VALID
WAIVER THERETO.
In the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), the United States Supreme Coupt held that the
prosecutor may not use statements of a defendant obtained during
custodial interrogation unless that defendant has been properly
informed of his rights and has "voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently" waived those rights. Miranda v. Arizona, at 444.
In this case, defendant had been informed!of his Miranda rights
to remain silent, to have an attorney retained or appointed, and
was further informed that anything he said could be used against
him (R. 285, p. 35). Defendant does not ^uggest that the Miranda
warnings were not given; rather, defendant contends that he
-could not speak English well enough to understand the nature of
his Miranda rights, nor to enter valid waiver thereto."
(Defendant's Brief at 30). Defendant further points to a
statement of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
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<

Circuit in the case of United States v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 1227,
1235 (9th Cir. 1978) which reads:
<

We assume without so holding that if Miranda
warnings are given in a language which the
person being so instructed does not
understand, a waiver of those rights would
not be valid. . . .
However, the State submits that in the instant case defendant
gave ample evidence that he not only understood the warnings, but
he knowingly and intelligently made decisions based on those
warnings to initially remain silent and then to personally
initiate further conversation with the deputy who had given him
the warning.
In the case of State v. Bueno, 499 So.2d 362 (La. Ct.
App. 1986), the defendant claimed that he did not knowingly and
intelligently waive his Miranda rights because "the rights were
given to him in English which was his second language."
Bueno, at 363.

State v.

However, the Court of Appeal of Louisiana in the

Fourth Circuit found that evidence that the defendant could
speak, write, and understand English overcame the claim that
defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda
rights because they were given to him in English, which was his
second language.

Ki. at 362.

Specifically, the Louisiana court

pointed to the testimony of the defendant's sister, who said that
he could speak English and had written her letters in that
language; the fact that even when the rights were later read to
him in Spanish, he continued to affirm his understanding in
spoken English; and the fact that during the entire interrogation
the defendant never indicated that he did not understand English
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and the officers had no difficulty in unae*standing him.

:id. at

364.
In the present case, there is no hard evidence of the
fact as to whether defendant can read or wifite in English;
however, there is an abundance of testimony that defendant easily
conversed in English during the interrogation which took place on
January 15, 1986 at the time of the search of the residence.
First, Officer John Conforti testified that at the time defendant
entered the home, defendant's initial exclamation, "I live here,
What's going on? M # was in English, and thatf. all further
conversation remained in that language (R. 285, p. 25). Upon
being further questioned as to whether defendant spoke in "broken
English,H Officer Conforti asserted, "No, lje spoke very well but
with a Spanish accent."

(R. 285, p. 41),

The officer also

testified that he conversed with defendant for a total of about
one hour, all responses were in English, arid defendant never gave
any indication that he had trouble underst4nding (R. 285, p. 4849).
A second officer, Deputy Mike Julian, also testified
that he heard defendant speaking English for "quite sometime.
Off and on when I was going throughout the home" (R. 285, p. 71).
When asked on recross examination if what He heard was "broken
English," Deputy Julian stated, "it was fairly plain to me.
was understandable."

(R. 285, p. 73). Andther officer also

testified that defendant had been heard spdaking unbroken
understandable English (R. 285, p. 55-56).
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It

Concerning the events directly surrounding the time
when defendant was given his Miranda warnings, Officer Conforti
testified as follows:
Q:

And where was that that you gave him
Miranda?

A:

It was in the upstairs rear bedroom.

Q:

Did you inquire as to whether or not he
understood English?

A:

Yes I did.

Q:

And what was his response as far as that?

A:

He stated that he spoke English and we
had briefly conversed earlier.

Q:

The rights that you gave him under
Miranda what did he say in reference to
those?

A:

He stated that he understood them, but
that he did not wish to answer questions
at that time.

Q:

After he made that statement to you did
you pursue any further questioning with
him?

A:

Not at that time no.

Q:

Did there come a point in time where he
returns to talk to you?

A:

Uh yes he asked to speak to me yes.

Q:

When was that after you had given him
Miranda?
It was about five minutes later.

A:
(R. 163).

Although this testimony strongly suggests that
defendant both understood his Miranda rights and could easily
converse in the English language, in his testimony in connection
with defendant's motions to clarify Court's ruling on suppression

of evidence, defendant asserted that on the night in question he
was afraid for his life and he tried to u^e what little English
he knew because he recognized the police as being Americans and
assumed that no one spoke Spanish (R. 284,1 p. 12). The substance
of defendant's testimony then is that although defendant could
speak only very simple English (R. 284, p. 10), his initial
exclamation and all conversations thereafter took place in
English.

He also directly answered Officer Conforti that he

understood English and continued to speak in such a manner that
all of the officers who testified denied that he was speaking
"broken English.11

Furthermore, defendant jwas able to do this

even though he admittedly feared for his 1|ife.

In contrast, the

officers found that defendant's companion,! Mr. Villalobas did not
speak English, and Mr. Contreras was also only Spanish-speaking
(R. 285, p. 55, 67). The testimony is conflicting as to whether
Mr. Medina or both he and defendant were used as translators (R.
285, p. 55, 67).
In his brief, defendant points to the case of United
States v. Beltran, 761 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 19$5) (Defendant
improperly cites this case as United States v. Elles-Martinez) as
support of his contention that defendant should have been offered
his Miranda warnings in Spanish.

Defendant states that "even

though some members of the crew knew some yords of English, the
government agents dealing with the defendants realized that in
order to obtain a valid waiver, the defendants must be informed
of their rights in Spanish."

(Defendant's *rief at 31).

However, the instant case is clearly distinguishable.
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In

Beltran, Spanish was the only language spoken by the crew aboard
the Panamanian-registered vessel.

In this case it has been

clearly established that defendant was not limited to one
language and the argument simply concerns the proficiency of his
understanding of English.
Defendant seems to confuse the facts of Beltran with
another case, United States v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir.
1978), in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the
reading of the Miranda warnings with a Mexican accent to
defendants who had a Cuban accent did not render the warnings
inadequate.

United States v. Martinezy at 1227.

In that case,

the Court pointed out that although the defendant claims to not
have understood the officer who read the warnings, he continued
to converse with him.
in the case at hand.

Id. at 1235. A similar situation occurred
Although defendant claims not to have

understood the warnings, and had an allegedly limited English
vocabulary, he still returned to the officer to question him
concerning the charges and possible penalties that were facing
him (R. 283, p. 43, R. 163).
The State submits that the evidence clearly points to
the conclusion that defendant could, in fact, understand English
with a proficiency that allowed him to comprehend and act upon
the Miranda warnings given him.

He conversed in English, he told

the officer that he understood English, and at no time did he
offer any signs that he needed the information given to him in
Spanish.

Surely the simple fact that a person speaks with an

accent, although the English is understandable, is not enough to
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require that a translator must be employed.

Further, the fact

that defendant chose silence following th^ reading of the Miranda
warnings, and then personally initiated a further dialogue with
Officer Conforti suggests that he understood the rights and then
reconsidered his options, although he was informed of the
opportunity for counsel.
Miranda simply requires that a vfaiver be voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently given.

Ther0 is no evidence of

coercion on the part of the police; defendant admittedly
approached Officer Conforti and directed an inquiry to him (R.
283, p. 43, R. 163). As for whether defendant's waiver was
intelligent, in State v. McKnight, 243 A.2d 240 (N.J. 1968),
where the defendant had previously been gi^ven his Miranda
warnings, the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated that H[i]t is
irrelevant that the prisoner, so advised, chooses to speak
without counsel because he misconceives hijs need for aid or the
utility of a lawyer.H

State v. McKnight, at at 247.

In this

case, although no interpreter was obtained, defendant was
apprised of his rights, and he voluntarily waived those rights
when he chose to approach the officer and inquire further into
the matter without the assistance or advice of counsel.
POINT IV
STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT AFTER HE INVOKED
HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED FOR IMPEApHMENT
PURPOSES.
In a minute entry dated Septembet 23, 1987, the
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson ruled on defendant's motion to
clarify court's ruling on suppression of evidence and stated that
-35-

"the testimony Ayala volunteered is admissible but the testimony
obtained as he was interrogated in the police car is not
admissible."

(R. 207). The State concedes that in accordance

with this ruling, defendant's statements in response to further
police questioning after invocation of his right to silence were
inadmissible as part of the State's case in chief.

Although, as

defendant points out in his brief, Officer Conforti's questioning
of defendant following defendant's invocation of his right to
silence appears in the record of the preliminary hearing, which
was attached to defendant's motion to clarify, no such statements
were elicited form Officer Conforti during the trial, and error
was thereby avoided.

Argument on this point is therefore

unnecessary.
However, at trial, Deputy Labrum was questioned
extensively concerning statements made to him by defendant during
an illegal post-Miranda interrogation (R. 283, pp. 87-104).
These statements were not produced for the State's case in chief;
rather, they were submitted for impeachment purposes in
conjunction with specific statements made by defendant during his
testimony.

On direct examination, defendant testified as

follows:
Q:

Mr. Ayala, have you ever sold heroin to
anybody?

A:

No.

•

Q:

• •

No. Did you ever help anyone else who
lived at this house sell heroin?
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A:
•

No.
• •

Q:

Was any of the money found msiae the
house by the police your money, inside
the house?

A:

No.

Q:

I believe that's what the policeman
testified.

A:

I would have never left it irt the
kitchen.

It was in the kitchen.

(R. 283, pp. 51-52).
The State questioned officer Labrum as to statements made to him
by defendant, although illegally post-Mirandaf that were in
direct opposition to defendant's proffered statements.

Officer

Labrum testified that defendant stated that he had been selling
dope and had acquired approximately $15,000 (R. 283, p. 90).
Assuming that defendant's statements were inadmissible
in the State's case in chief under the Fift^i Amendment, this
Court may still find that it was not error to admit them in this
case.

Confessions obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436 (1966) have long been held admissible for
impeachment purposes.

Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971);

Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); United States v. Bowers, 593
F.2d 376, 379-80 (10th Cir. 1979).

This principle was recently

reaffirmed in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1984).

The

policy underlying these decisions is that a defendant should not
be allowed to use the illegal method by which evidence was
obtained as Ha shield against contradiction^ of his untruths."
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1$54).
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While a

defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, the
privilege does not include a right to commit perjury.
401 U.S. at 225.

Harris,

For these reasons, the testimony of Officer

Labrum which directly contradicted statements and denials made by
defendant in direct examination were properly admitted, although
those statements were improperly obtained through post-Miranda
interrogation.

Statements beyond this scope, although mentioned

in defendant's brief, were not elicited at trial.

(See

Defendant's Brief at 38; R. 283, p. 102).
In addition, defendant argues that the jury was not
properly instructed that his unmirandized statements could not be
used for purposes of determining guilt and were only admissible
for the purpose of impeachment.

However, at the conclusion of

the trial, the court stated:
I ask you to get together with the reporter
and put your exceptions on the record. You
may do it prior to the jury returning.
Otherwise you will have waived all rights to
any exceptions.
(R. 283, p. 116.)

In response, defendant took exception to two

instructions concerning possession of narcotics, but made no
reference to the need of a jury instruction concerning the nonMirandized statements (R. 283, p. 116). In addition, no such
instruction was offered in defendant's request for jury
instructions (R. 215-217).

Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Criminal

Procedure states;
(c) No party may assign as error any portion
of the charge or omission therefrom unless he
objects thereto before the jury is
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to
which he objects and the ground of his
objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure

to object, error may be assigned to
instructions in order to avoid a manifest
injustice.
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-19(c) (1953 as amenqed).
Valdez, 19 Utah 2d 426, 432 P.2d 53 (1967)

In State v.

the defendant therein

appealed his conviction of assault with a deadly weapon on the
ground that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury
on the lesser and included offense of simple assault.

This

Court, in upholding the defendant's conviction, stated:
As a general rule the trial cdurt should
submit to the jury included offenses where
the evidence would justify such a verdict.
But like all general rules, there are
exceptions and it may depend on the
circumstances. In this case there was no
request, either written or oral, for an
instruction on the lesser offensel of assault.
We say this advisedly after havinlg examined
the statements of counsel which defendant now
argues should be deemed sufficient to
constitute a request. If the defendant had
desired that procedure, it was hi s duty to
submit a proper request in writing, or at
least to clearly indicate to the pourt orally
that such was his desire.
432 P.2d at 54 (emphasis added).

In State V. Kazda, 545 P.2d 190

(Utah 1976), a defendant convicted of the theft of copper wire
claimed error on the ground that the trial Court failed to
instruct the jury that an honest mistake of fact constituted a
defense to the charge of theft.

This Court, while agreeing that

an honest mistake of fact was indeed a defense to a charge of
theft, held that the failure of the defendant to submit a written
request for such an instruction or to take oral exception to the
instructions given precluded the defendant £rom asserting as
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error the failure of the trial court to so instruct the jury.

In

so holding, the Court noted:
There is an important purpose to be served by
the rule requiring that objections be made to
the instructions. It gives an opportunity
for the court to correct, or to fill in any
inadequacy in the instructions, so that the
jury may consider the case on a proper basis*
In order to accomplish that purpose, the rule
should be adhered to. Accordingly, the
standard rule is that when a party fails to
make a proper objection to an erroneous
instruction, or to present to the court a
proper request to supply any claimed
deficiency in the instructions, he is
thereafter precluded from contending error. . . .
545 P.2d at 193 (footnotes omitted).
As noted above, Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-19(c) (1953 as
amended) provides that "error may be assigned to instructions in
order to avoid a manifest injustice."

The Utah Supreme Court has

held in civil cases that the burden of showing special
circumstances which could warrant a departure from Rule 51 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

precluding consideration of

Rule 51, Instructions to Jury; Objections:
"At the close of the evidence or at such
earlier time during the trial as the court
reasonably directs, any party may file
written requests that the court instruct the
jury on the law as set forth in said
requests. The court shall inform counsel of
its proposed action upon the requests prior
to instructing the jury; and it shall furnish
counsel with a copy of its proposed
instructions; unless the parties stipulate
that such instructions may be given orally,
or otherwise waive this requirement. If the
instructions are to be given in writing, all
objections thereto must be made before the
instructions are given to the jury;
otherwise, objections may be made to the
instructions after they are given to the
jury, but before the jury retires to consider
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alleged errors concerning instructions, in the absence of
objection thereto, rests on the party seeking to vary it.

McCall

v. Kendrickf 2 Utah 2d 364, 274 P.2d 962 (}954):
Normally the rules themselves mu$t govern
procedure and are to be followed unless some
persuasive reason to the contrary invokes the
discretion of the Court to extricate a person
from a situation where some gross injustice
or inequity would otherwise result. The
burden of showing special circumstances which
would warrant a departure from the rule rests
upon the party seeking to vary it. . . .
>74 P.2d at 963 (footnote omitted).

While McCall is a civil

rase, its analysis of the application of Ri^le 51 can properly be
ronsidered in a criminal appeal.

Defendani has pointed to no

special circumstances in his case which woiild warrant this
Court's departure from Rule 19, and indeed the record in this
case is void of any such "special circumstances."
Defendant's failure to make his Request for an
instruction concerning Utah Code Ann. § 77435-19(c) in writing,
his apparent waiver of his oral request foij such an instruction,
defendant's failure to take exception to the trial court's
failure to so instruct, and his failure to point to "special

Cont.
its verdict. No party may assign as error
the giving or the failure to give an
instruction unless he objects thereto. In
objecting to the giving of an instruction,
party must state distinctly the matter to
which he objects and the grounds |for his
objection. Notwithwtanding the foregoing
requirement, the appellate court in its
discretion and in the interests of justice,
may review the giving or failure to give an
instruction. Opportunity shall be given to
make objections, and they shall i\e made, out
of the hearing of the jury. . •
-41-

circumstances" which would warrant a departure from the
requirements of Rule 19, preclude defendant from asserting error
on appeal.
POINT V
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS WERE ALLOWABLE BECAUSE
THEY WERE VOLUNTEERED UNDER A PROPER WAIVER
OF FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGES, WERE ADMITTED
FOR LIMITED IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES, OR, WERE
SUPPRESSED ACCORDING TO THE RULING ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CLARIFY COURT'S RULING
ON SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE.
The State submits that based on the foregoing arguments
in Points II, III, and IV, any statements made by defendant that
were admitted during the trial phase of this proceeding were
properly entered because they represent volunteered statements,
knowingly and intelligently given following Miranda warnings; or
the statements were admitted for the limited use of impeachment.
Any other statements were effectively suppressed in accordance
with the Court's minute entry of September 23, 1987 (R. 207).
The State further submits that defendant's "fruit of the
poisonous tree" argument is answered by State's Argument, Point
I, in that the search was proper as a search incident to probable
cause to arrest.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the State
respectfully requests that the Court affirm defendant's

conviction of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance with
Intent to Distribute for Value, a second decree felony.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /(

^

day of July, 1988.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney general

DAN R. LARSEN
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true arid accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid,
to Larry R. Keller, attorney for defendant, 257 Towers, Suite
340,
East 200 South - 10, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this
J 1 U , 257
^J

4&

day of July, 1988.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

T.t. 'TED" CANNON
County Attorney
By: MICHAEL J. CHRISTENSEN
Deputy County Attorney
Courtside Office Building
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah
84UI
Phone: (801) 363-7900

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAltE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

)
):

County of Salt Lake

$$

)
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH KARRAlNT

BFF0RE:

rleanor "Van—Sc-t-ve-f
JUDGE

The undersigned

4S0 South 2nd East
ADDRESS

affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

That he has reason to believe
That

(X) on the premises known as 8853
yellow brick, yellow wood on
sides and a split entry.

Julia Lane (3255 S o u t h ) ,
front.
White siding on

In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah,
Is now certain property or evidence described as:

there

Heroin, cutting agents, weighing and packaging materials, transaction
ledgers and other related controlled substances and/or devices.
and that said property or evidence:
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed;
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense;
(X) Is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means
of committing or concealing a public offense;
( X ) consists of an Item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct;
( X ) consists of an Item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to
the illegal ccnduct.
[Mete requirements of Utah Code
Annotated, 77-23-3(2))
fflant
believes
the property
and
evidence described
above
Is
vidence of the c r U e f s ) of POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH
STENT TO DISTRIBUTE FOR VALUE.

PAGE TWO
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH
The facts
• re:

WARRANT

to establish

the grounds

for

Issuance

of

a

Search

'»•-

»M

Your affiant. a d=:ectlve with the Salt Lake County s*.%.
N a r c o t i c s Unit states:
Your affiant made a r r a n g e m e n t s for a Confidential l-.f
to n a V e a controlled drug buy at the residence of 8853 J u l * ,
Salt LaVe C o u n t y . The C.l. w a s given a body^ search by detect, »,f°5.
i; the N a r c o t i c s
Unit. under the d i r e c t i o n of yo ur affiant. J T
Your •"'•-••• <£,
• c o n t r o l l e d substances or U.S. currency were found.
V^j^ave t h e C . I . a predetermined amount of m o n e y
\ ^;)
W i t h i n the last ssv-n ( 7 ) days the C . l . was t r a n s p o r t .
1v
t h e area of 8853 Julia Lane.
T h e C . t .w^s observed e n t e r i • • J
r e s i d e n c e and exit it a short time l a t e r ; times being reco
your a f f i a n t .
The C.T. was never out of t^ie visual c o n t a c t
^J.
for w h e n inside the residence of 8853 Julia L a n e ) of the a f f i a n r
other detectives
The C.t. turned over to yiur affiant a q u a n t a ,
h e r o i n that the C.I. stated had been purchased inside the r e s i ^ The h e r o i n w a s field tested and flashed positive by u s e o!
B e c t i n - D i c k i n s o n Field Test Kit. • T h e C . I .was again gaven a fcom;: f .^
body search and no controlled s u b s t a n c e s or U S . currency were ° ^ t

ft

Your affiant considers the information received from the confidential
Informant reliable because (if a n y Information Is obtained fret *•
unnamed source)
^~
A n o t h e r _ C . J > h a s stated that drugs.! specifically heroin %
and h a s freTn sold out of the residence of $853 Julia Lane for %**.
t iroe.
WHEREFORE, the affiant
seizure of said iteas:
(X) at any
believe

prays

that

a Search Warrant

be

issued

for t^.t

time day or night because
there Is reason
it Is necessary to seize the property P*.ior t 0

being concealed, d e s t r o y e d ,
other good reasons, t o - w l t :

damaged,

or altered,

t*
l%

or for

It Is further requested that (If a p p r o p r i a t e ) the officer executive
the requested warrant not be required to glvel notice of the officer %
a u t h o r i t y or purpose b e c a u s e :
(X) p h y s i c a l harm •ay
«ay r e s u l t to any person If notice were
g i v e n ; or
(X) the property sought may be quickly destroyed, d i s p o s e !
of, or secreted.

PAGE THREE
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

This danger i s be U ^ e ^ T ^ ^ i I st because:
Another C.^K—h^srseen on d i f f e r e n t o c c a s i o n s weapons
the residence and knows that A handgun i s i n s i d e the r e s i d e n c e .

'j r
/n\

AFFIANT
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME t h i s V *

Ji.

inside

^P...

.
dajt-4>f January,

1986.

V"
JUD5E IN THE FIFTH C I R C U F T COURT,
IN AND FOR S M T LAKE COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH

APPENDIX B

T.L: " T E D " CANNOH
County Attorney
By: MICHAEL J. CHRISTENSEN
Deputy County* Attorney
Courtslde Office Building
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone:
(801) 363-7900

IN T H E FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SEARCH WARRANT

No.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
To any peace officer in the State of Utah.
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by
John Conforti • Salt Lake County Sheriff's Narcotics Division, I am
satisfied that there is probable cause to believe

That

(X) on the premises known as 88S3 Julia Lane (3255 South),
yellow brick, yellow wood on fr^nt.
White siding on
sides and a split entry.

In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there
I*

now certain property or evidence described as

H e r o i n , cutting agents, weighing and packaging materials, transaction
ledgers and other related controlled substances and/or devices.
and that said property or evidence:
(X) w a s unlawfully acquired or Is unlawfully possessed;
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense;
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means
of committing or concealing a public offense;
(X) consists of an Item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a party to the Illegal conduct;
(X) consists of an Item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to
the illegal conduct.
[Note requirements cf Utah Code
Annotated, 77-23-3(2)1
Affiant
believes
the property and evidence described
above Is
evidence of the crirae(s) of POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH
INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE FOR VALUE.

PAGE TWO
SEARCH WARRANT
above-named
or
described
to
make
a ^search
of
the
person(s) f
vehlcle(s) f and premises for the hereln-abbve described property or
evidence and If you find the same or any part thereof, to bring It
forthwith before me at the H f t h Circuit Co urt f County of Salt Lake,
State of Utah, or retain such property In your custody, subject to
the order of this court.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated thls/^T

da y ^>f January, 1986.

J U D G E OF

FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT

